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HOW A RULING ON ABORTION TOOK ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
April 10, 1994, Sunday, Late Edition - Final
Linda Greenhouse
SUPREME Court Justices can usually time
their own departures, as Justice Harry A. Blackmun
did with grace and good humor last week. "I know
what the numbers are, and it's time," the 85-year-old
Justice said in announcing his decision to leave the
Court this summer after 24 years.
But Justices have no such control over their
legacy, and as Justice Blackmun has long
acknowledged, he will always be known by one of
the earliest Supreme Court opinions to bear his
signature: Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that
established the constitutional right to abortion. With
passion and pride, he embraced and defended his
handiwork as it came under sustained attack from all
sides: from abortion opponents, obviously, but also
from critics who, while supporting rights as a matter
of policy, viewed the opinion as an example of
judicial overreaching, weak in its constitutional
theory and mired in detail about the stages of
pregnancy and other matters best left to legislatures.
In the end, Roe v. Wade took on a life of its
own, evolving into something so in tune with the
ideals of the American mainstream that even
conservative Republican Justices, who almost surely
would not have joined the original Roe v. Wade
majority, would not repudiate it.
Harry Blackmun alone could not have
preserved Roe v. Wade. As the decision's margin of
support dwindled -- from the original 7-to-2 to 6-to-3
and then to 5-to-4 -- on a Court reshaped by two
Presidents who vowed to see the precedent wiped off
the books, the likelihood that Roe v. Wade would
outlast its author appeared remote. Of the seven
members of the majority in 1973, only Justice
Blackmun remained by 1991. All the others had been
replaced by Republican Presidents. The momentum
against the decision seemed unstoppable.
And yet Justice Blackmun is retiring and
Roe v. Wade is still the law. More precisely, it is
still the law as somewhat redefined at the margins by
a trio of Republican Justices whose suprising opinion
two years ago in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
reaffirmed what they called the "central principle"
and "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade: "the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability."
While the 1992 decision left unresolved
questions, that basic premise appears to be settled.
Harry Blackmun will leave the Court with his legacy
secure. How, against all the apparent odds, did Roe
v. Wade survive?
One answer may be that there are two Roe
v. Wades, the one he announced for the Court in
1973 and the one that it became, occupying a special
place in the social fabric beyond the expectations of
those who received it, with relief, anger or disdain,
21 years ago.
A comment from Justice Blackmun himself
at the White House news conference announcing his
retirement underscored, almost certainly
inadvertently, the full dimension of the opinion's
evolution. Asked to explain the decision's continuing
importance, he said: "I think it's a step that had to
be taken as we go down the road toward the full
emancipation of women."
Yet in the 53 pages of the original opinion,
there is scarcely a passage that could be distilled into
a rallying cry for the emancipation of women.
Unwanted motherhood "may force upon the woman
a distressful life and future," the opinion stated.
"Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care." The "continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved."
The premise of the opinion was that
unwanted pregnancy presents women with potential
medical and social problems that "the woman and
her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation" when deciding how to proceed. The
point of view, reflecting Justice Blackmun's
sympathy for the medical profession developed
during a decade as general counsel to the Mayo
Clinic, was that of a doctor seeking the ability to
exercise informed medical judgment about a patient's
problem without government intrusion.
The Justice From Mayo
"Harry Blackmun was speaking as the
Justice from Mayo," said David J. Garrow, the
historian and author of a new book on the roots of
Roe v. Wade, "Liberty & Sexuality" (Macmillan).
"What Roe meant has changed over the years and we
have to understand that Blackmun's understanding of
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Roe has changed as well. He began speaking for
women and not for doctors."
This sentence -- "The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives" -- is not from Roe
v. Wade. It is from the plurality opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey written jointly by Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and
David H. Souter. Given that the Casey opinion
provides the current definition of Roe v. Wade, the
sentence marks the place on the American landscape
to which the original opinion has migrated. Roe v.
Wade survived, perhaps, by transcending itself.
Those who oppose the right to abortion and
who regard Roe v. Wade as an exercise in
illegitimate judicial power tend to explain its survival
in terms of politics.
"The single biggest reason that Roe v. Wade
is the law of the land today is the November 1986
Senate election," said Clarke Forsythe, vice
president and general counsel of Americans United
for Life, a leading advocacy group. In that election,
Democrats recaptured the Senate, which they had
lost in the Reagan landslide of 1980, and made it
possible to defeat the Supreme Court nomination of
Robert H. Bork in 1987. Had Judge Bork been on
the Court five years later instead of Anthony M.
Kennedy, President Reagan's eventual choice for the
vacancy, the 5-to-4 vote in the Casey decision would
almost surely have been to overturn Roe v. Wade
rather than preserve it.
But the defeat of Judge Bork could, at most,
have bought only a few years for the pro-choice side
had the public disliked Roe v. Wade enough to make
its reversal a priority at the polls. Six months after
the Casey decision, Bill Clinton was elected
President, and barely six months after that, with his
choice of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to succeed Justice
Byron R. White, the margin of support for the right
to abortion grew to 6-to-3.
"In the end, the power of courts is the power
of persuasion," said Walter Dellinger, a Duke
University law professor who is now an assistant
attorney general. "Their opinions are only successful
if they are consistent with the deepest movements in
society."
Mr. Dellinger, a strong advocate of abortion
rights, continued: "Roe v. Wade is like an old Dick
Tracy cartoon -- it's shot full of holes but it's still
standing. Blackmun had the instinct for the right
result. It was picked apart by law professors, but it
turns out that the reasoning of Roe appeared much
more thin and brittle at the time than it does now.
The more that women came to be seen as full moral
agents, with rights against intrusion from the state,
the more it has seemed to tap into a deep
anti-totalitarian principle that's embedded in our
notion of liberty.
"That's where we've come since 1973," he
said.
Copyright @1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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COURT UPHOLDS BUFFER ZONES AROUND CLINICS
Abortion Foes Must Keep Distance
Copyright 1994 Legal Communications, Ltd.
The Legal Intelligencer
July 1, 1994, Friday
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
A STATE JUDGE DID not violate the
free-speech rights of anti-abortion protesters when he
kept them 36 feet away from a Melbourne, Fla.,
abortion clinic, the Supreme court ruled yesterday.
But the court also said the judge went too far in
limiting protesters' activities within 300 feet of the
clinic.
Yesterday's ruling in the closely watched
Florida case immediately fanned the emotional
national debate over abortion at a time when violence
at abortion clinics has escalated to include bombings,
fires and even a murder. Abortion-rights advocates
said they consider the decision a victory;
anti-abortion activists were enraged. The decision
was fragmented, yielding four separate opinions.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote
for a 6-3 majority in ruling that the 36-foot buffer
zone generally "burdens no more speech than
necessary to accomplish the government interest at
stake" -- protecting access to the clinic. Rehnquist
was joined in that view by Justices Harry A.
Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
SCALIA DISSENTS
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented. "Creation of a
36-foot zone in which only a particular group, which
had broken no law, cannot exercise its rights of
speech, assembly and association .. . (is) profoundly
at odds with our First Amendment precedents and
traditions," Scalia wrote for the three. The
Constitution's First Amendment protects the freedom
of speech.
Owners of the Aware Women Center for
Choice in Melbourne sued Operation Rescue, an
anti-abortion group, in 1991. The lawsuit led to a
permanent injunction banning certain activities
outside the clinic. Reacting to subsequent
anti-abortion demonstrations at the clinic, a judge
last year said the original restrictions were
insufficient.
PATIENT INTERFERENCE
The judge found that Operation Rescue
members often interfered with patients and staff
members trying to enter or leave the clinic.
Demonstrators went to the homes of clinic patients
and employees, sometimes ringing the doorbells of
neighbors and identifying clinic employees as "baby
killers." They sometimes followed patients and
clinic employees "in a stalking manner," according
to the judge, and on occasion threatened violence
against clinic patients and employees.
The judge's 1993 injunction barred certain
Operation Rescue members and others "acting in
concert" with them from, among other things:
* Entering the property or premises of the
clinic.
* Blocking, impeding or obstructing access
to any building or parking lot of the clinic.
* Singing, chanting, whistling, shouting,
yelling, using bullhorns, auto horns or other loud
sounds within earshot of patients inside the clinic.
Most notably, the judge created a 36-foot
protective bubble around the clinic. He barred the
Operation Rescue members and their cohorts from
picketing or carrying out any other type of
demonstration within that area. He also created a
300-foot protest-free zone, and barred
demonstrations from approaching, uninvited, anyone
seeking to enter or leave the clinic.
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
injunction, but in a separate case the Atlanta-based
I Ith U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said it probably
is unconstitutional. The state court's ruling was
appealed by Judy Madsen and Ed Martin, members
of Rescue America, and Shirley Hobbs, another
anti-abortion activist. All three said they never had
blocked access to the Melbourne clinic.
300-FOOT BAN DENIED
Yesterday's decision allows much of the
judge's injunction to stand, but said the case record
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did not support such a broad -- 300-foot -- ban on
picketing and other peaceful forms of protest.
Rehnquist said the judge and local officials can
require protesters to turn down the volume of their
protests, however.
"The First Amendment does not demand
that patients at the medical facility undertake
Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests," Rehnquist said. "If
over-amplified loud-speakers assault the
citizenry, government may turn them down.
This is what the state court did here, and we
hold that its action was proper."
Twice before in the past 18 months the court
has decided disputes over abortion clinic
demonstrations. The court last year ruled that
federal judges could not invoke a Civil War-era law,
the Ku Klux Klan Act, to stop protesters who try to
block women's access to clinics. But the court last
January ruled that some such protesters may be sued
and thwarted in federal court as racketeers.
FATAL SHOOTING
Responding to the fatal shooting last year of
Dr. David Gunn outside his Pensacola, Fla.,
abortion clinic, Congress passed legislation providing
stringent penalties for anti-abortion violence and for
blocking access to clinics. President Clinton, in
signing the law May 26, said it was "designed to
eliminate violence and coercion" and was "not a
strike against the First Amendment." But
anti-abortion groups around the country quickly went
to court and mounted First Amendment challenges to
the law. Lower courts must now comb through
yesterday's ruling for guidance in judging the
constitutionality of the new federal law.
Madsen, present at the court to hear the
decision, said, "If I were pro-choice, I'd be allowed
to say anything I wanted to say anywhere . . . as a
pro-lifer, my rights have been trampled on."
Madsen's lawyer, Mathew Staver, said, "Today, the
Supreme Court betrayed us."
Eleanor Smeal of the Feminist Majority said
the ruling "establishes that a woman doesn't have to
walk a gauntlet to protect her right to abortion."
Smeal said, however, she was concerned about the
court striking the judge's 300-foot protection zone.
(Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 93-880.)
Reprinted by permission of The Legal
Intelligencer.
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93-1820 SEJPAL v. CORSON, MITCHELL.
TOMHAVE & MCKINLEY M.D.S. INC.
Ban against tort claims for wrongful birth.
Ruling below (Pa SuperCt, 1/26/93):
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions are
specifically barred by Pennsylvania statute, 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 8305; couple's claim that
such statutory preclusion places impermissible
burden on woman's right to abortion, and is thus
unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 LW
4795 (US SupCt 1992), was waived because state
was not party to action and record reveals no
indication that plaintiffs provided state attorney
general with notice of their constitutional chal-
lenge in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 521(a).
Question presented: Does Pennsylvania statute,
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 8305, that prohibits civil
tort claims for "wrongful life" and "wrongful
birth" violate fundamental right to make procre-
ative decisions or, by its purpose or effect, impose
"undue burden" on woman's right to choose
abortion?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/12/94, by Kath-
ryn Kolbert, Lenora M. Lapidus, Sarah E.
Graves, and Center for Reproductive Law &
Policy, all of New York, N.Y., and Linda Whar-
ton, Susan Frietsche, and Women's Law Project,
all of Philadelphia, Pa.
93-1943 SHEPPARD v. BEERMAN
Discharge of law clerk who threatened to expose
judicial misconduct-Search of clerk's papers.
Ruling below (CA 2, 18 F.3d 147):
Free flow of information between law clerk and
judge precludes law clerk's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in chambers' appurtenances,
desks, file cabinets, or other work areas; accord-
ingly, judge's search of clerk's work area follow-
ing clerk's dismissal did not violate Fourth
Amendment, and, even if some of clerk's belong-
ings were seized for short period of time during
search, seizure was not unreasonable under cir-
cumstances and did not violate Fourth Amend-
ment; law clerk who was escorted from court-
house following dismissal by judge and was
prevented from returning to courthouse or judge's
chambers, was free to go anywhere else and was
thus not restrained to extent required to consti-
tute violation of Fourth Amendment's restrictions
on seizures.
Questions presented: (1) In ruling that law
clerks as class do not have reasonable expectation
of privacy in their private offices and their desks
and file cabinets therein, did Second Circuit
properly apply case-by-case approach espoused by
plurality of this court in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480U.S. 709 (1987)? (2) Is seizure of government
employee's private belongings upon his or her
retaliatory discharge reasonable if purpose of
seizure is to suppress evidence of employer's mis-
conduct that led to discharge and if seizure con-
tinues over period of days? (3) If law clerk is
discharged for objecting to misconduct of judge
for whom he or she works, does Fourth Amend-
ment impose any restrictions on judge's examina-
tion of clerk's private papers found during search
of clerk's workplace after discharge? (4) Is court
employee seized within meaning of Fourth
Amendment when he or she is forcibly removed
from courthouse and prevented from re-entering
it?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/1/94, by Brian
Sheppard, pro se, of New Hyde Park, N.Y.
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BRIAN SHEPPARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEON BEERMAN, as an individual and in his official
capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 93-7658
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
18 F.3d 147; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3985
November 2, 1993, Argued
March 3, 1994, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Glasser, J.), dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. Civ. P.
12(c).
DISPOSITION: Affirmed, in part, and vacated and remanded, in part.
COUNSEL: BRIAN SHEPPARD, New Hyde Park, N.Y., Pro Se.
JOHN J. SULLIVAN, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, N.Y. (Robert
Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGES: Before: OAKES, KEARSE, and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Brian Sheppard, appearing
pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Glasser, J.), dismissing his complaint on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ("Rule
12(c)"). Sheppard, a law clerk to defendant-appellee
Leon Beerman, a justice of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, was discharged following a
heated dispute with Beerman. Sheppard subsequently
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
alleging that his discharge and Beerman's conduct
following the discharge violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights. In his complaint, Sheppard
claimed that he was fired in "retaliation for [his]
protesting, and [sic] considering to expose, judicial
misconduct." He further alleged that subsequent to
the discharge, Beerman illegally searched his office
and seized his belongings. The district court
dismissed Sheppard's claims on the pleadings,
finding that he failed to state any cognizable
constitutional claims. On appeal, Sheppard
challenges the dismissal of each of his claims,
generally arguing that the district court made certain
improper factual findings in ruling on Beerman's
Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. For
the reasons discussed below, we agree with Sheppard
only as to one of his First Amendment claims.
Accordingly, we affirm, in part, and vacate and
remand, in part.
BACKGROUND
Sheppard served as a law clerk to Beerman
from 1986 until he was fired on December 11, 1990.
Because this case comes to us on a motion to
dismiss, we must view the facts in the light most
favorable to Sheppard. Accordingly, his view of the
facts alleges the following series of events preceding
and following his discharge.
Sheppard alleges that on December 6, 1990,
after engaging in ex parte communications with the
prosecution in a pending murder case, Beerman
ordered him to draft a decision denying the
defendant's pending speedy trial motion without a
hearing, regardless of the motion's merits, so that
the defendant would stand trial at a time
advantageous to the prosecution. Sheppard refused to
follow Beerman's direction, stating that he would not
take part in the "railroading" of the defendant.
Beerman responded that although Sheppard was not
being discharged, he should seek other employment
if he felt that way.
At this time, Sheppard informed Beerman
that he had taken extensive notes of instances of
other judicial misconduct by Beerman during the
preceding four years of Sheppard's service in
chambers. As an example, Sheppard noted a case
that Beerman had assigned to himself in order to take
personal revenge against the accused. Beerman
expressed concern about Sheppard making his notes
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public. Harsh words were exchanged between the
parties: Sheppard called Beerman "corrupt" and a
"son of a bitch," and Beerman called Sheppard
"disturbed" and "disloyal." Sheppard immediately
apologized for his characterization. The argument
ended with no resolution, and Sheppard worked the
remainder of the day.
When Sheppard next returned to work on
December 11, 1990, he was removed from chambers
by court officers, who informed him that Beerman
had fired him. Sheppard was forced to leave
immediately and not allowed to take his belongings
with him. Both before and after his discharge on that
day, Sheppard's property was searched by Beerman
or by others at his direction. Specifically, Sheppard's
file cabinets and desk drawers were searched, and a
box of his personal file cards was seized and
removed to Beerman's private office and examined.
On December 13, 1990, Sheppard was permitted to
return to chambers accompanied by court officers to
retrieve certain of his belongings. On December 21,
1990, he was permitted to retrieve the rest of his
personal files.
Following his discharge, Sheppard returned
to Beerman's courtroom on a number of occasions.
On January 18, 1991, while attending Beerman's
calendar call, Sheppard began ruffling through court
files. Beerman subsequently directed him to leave the
courtroom if he wished to examine documents. On
January 28, 1991, Beerman told an attorney not to
speak with Sheppard and warned Sheppard not to
involve himself in the cases Sheppard had worked on
when he was a clerk. On February 11, 1991,
Sheppard was told not to keep coming in and out of
the courtroom, and was told to be quiet when he
sought to reply to this direction.
Sheppard's Lawsuit
In April 1991, Sheppard commenced an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
above actions by Beerman violated Sheppard's First
Amendment right to free speech, his First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings
and documents, his First Amendment right to
petition the government for redress of grievances,
and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unlawful searches and seizures. Sheppard also
asserted pendent state law tort claims for, among
other things, false imprisonment, trespass,
conversion, and defamation. Beerman filed an
answer and then moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) on the grounds that
Sheppard had not met threshold pleading
requirements, that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, and that Beerman was entitled to
qualified immunity.
On May 21, 1993, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Glasser,
J.) granted Beerman's motion for judgment on the
pleadings on the grounds that Sheppard could not
state any cognizable constitutional claim under any
set of facts as a matter of law. Having held that
plaintiff failed to state any cognizable constitutional
claims, the court declined to exercise its pendant
jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
Sheppard now appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review the district court's grant of
Beerman's motion to dismiss Sheppard's claims de
novo. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d
455, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 419,
114 S. Ct. 467 (1993). In deciding a Rule 12(c)
motion, we apply the same standard as that
applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Ad-Hoc Comm. of Baruch Black and Hispanic
Alumni Ass'n v. Bernard M. Baruch College, 835
F.2d 980, 982 (2d Cir. 1987). Under that test, a
court must accept the allegations contained in the
complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-movant; it should not dismiss the
complaint "'unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."' Id.
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2
L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)). This standard is
"applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff
complains of a civil rights violation." Branum v.
Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted).
On appeal, Sheppard generally contends that
the district court erred in finding that he had not
stated cognizable constitutional claims. Each of
Sheppard's First and Fourth Amendment claims will
be discussed in turn.
I. First Amendment Claims
a. Free speech claims
Sheppard first contends that the district court
made improper factual findings in dismissing his
claim that his discharge amounted to a violation of
his First Amendment right to free speech. We agree,
and for the reasons discussed below vacate the
district court's dismissal of that claim and remand
for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
A state may not discharge an employee for
reasons which infringe on that employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
speech. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
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597, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972). If an
employee is discharged for making statements
concerning a matter of public concern, the
employee's freedom of speech may have been
violated. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
384, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 75 L. Ed. 2d
708, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). In such a situation, the
Court must balance the employee's interest in
making the statement against "'the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its
employees."' Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (quoting
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 20
L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968)).
Sheppard specifically alleges that he was
dismissed in retaliation for his exercise of free
speech in confronting Beerman about the judge's
alleged misconduct. In order for Sheppard's claim to
withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, he
must establish that his speech concerned a matter of
public concern, and that the speech was a motivating
factor in his discharge. See Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d
1317, 1330 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d
569, 114 S. Ct. 604 (1993). Speech will be fairly
characterized as a matter of public concern if the
speech "relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community." Connick, 461 U.S.
at 146. Whether speech involves a public concern is
a question of law to be determined on the basis of
the "the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at
147-48 & n.7.
In analyzing the validity of Sheppard's
claim, the district court made a determination that
Sheppard was actually discharged for insubordination
and not for his speech. We find this determination
problematic for two reasons. First, the motive behind
Sheppard's firing in his retaliation claim is clearly a
question of fact. See Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d at
1328-29. Because this question is in dispute, it was
improper for the district court to answer it on a
motion for dismissal on the pleadings. Second, the
district court's determination that Sheppard was
actually dismissed for insubordination seemed to
impact its determination that Sheppard's speech was
not a matter of public concern. Because the reason
for Sheppard's dismissal is not relevant to the legal
determination of whether his speech was a matter of
public concern, we find fault with the district court's
public concern analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's dismissal of Sheppard's First
Amendment free speech claim and remand for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
b. Remaining First Amendment claims
Sheppard next contends that the district court
erred in dismissing his claims concerning a violation
of his First Amendment right of access to criminal
cases, and his First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. As to these
contentions we disagree. Even assuming that all the
facts alleged by Sheppard in his complaint are true,
we find, as did the district court, that the facts do
not support either of those claims.
Sheppard claims that Beerman violated his
right to access to criminal proceedings by (i)
directing Sheppard to examine court files outside of
the courtroom; (ii) telling certain attorneys that it
would be improper for them to speak to Sheppard
about anything that Sheppard had learned during his
tenure as Beerman's law clerk; (iii) refusing to field
courtroom questions by those who were not parties
to cases on the calendar; and (iv) admonishing
Beerman to stop using the courtroom as a "revolving
door" when Sheppard went in and out of Beerman's
courtroom during a calendar call. Even assuming
that all of the above incidents occurred, they do not
indicate that Sheppard was denied a right of access
to criminal proceedings. Sheppard admits that he was
allowed to examine files outside of Beerman's
courtroom, and that he was also permitted to listen
to cases as long as he did not disrupt Beerman's
courtroom proceedings or waste the court's time.
Clearly, Beerman was entitled to exercise his
discretion in keeping decorum in his courtroom.
Sheppard's claim that he was deprived of his
right to petition for redress of grievances is equally
without merit. The instant action provides such a
vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of these claims.
II. Fourth Amendment Claims
A. Search/Seizure of Office, Desk, and
File Cabinets
Sheppard alleges that after the dismissal,
Beerman searched his office, desk, and file cabinets
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. "A
'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
113, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984). See
also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 94 L.
Ed. 2d 714, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987). The district
court ultimately concluded that Sheppard had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
furniture or file cabinets, and therefore any search
was not violative of Sheppard's Fourth Amendment
rights. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.
134
An "employee's expectation of privacy must
be assessed in the context of the employment
relationship." Ortega, 480 U.S. at 717. The working
relationship between a judge and her law clerk, as
noted by the district court, is unique. Unlike a
typical employment relationship where an employer
may limit the information she wants to share with
her employees, in order for a judicial chambers to
function efficiently, an absolute free flow of
information between the clerk and the judge is
usually necessary. Accordingly, the clerk has access
to all the documents pertaining to a case. More
importantly, clerks regularly have access to the
judge's confidential thoughts on a case. The judge
may discuss her feelings with her clerk, or may
allow the clerk access to her personal notes. In turn,
the judge necessarily has access to the files and
papers kept by the clerk, which will often include the
clerk's notes from discussions with the judge.
Because of this distinctive open access to documents
characteristic of judicial chambers, we agree with the
district court's determination that Sheppard had "no
reasonable expectation of privacy in chambers'
appurtenances, embracing desks, file cabinets or
other work areas." Accordingly, the district court
was correct in finding that there was no violation of
Sheppard's Fourth Amendment rights.
Moreover, we also agree with the district
court's finding that any alleged seizure done in
connection with the search was similarly not
violative of Sheppard's Fourth Amendment rights.
Even assuming that Sheppard's belongings were
seized for a short time during the judge's search of
his things, a short delay by a judicial employer in
returning a disgruntled employee's belongings after
the employee has been fired does not rise to the level
of a Fourth Amendment violation. The unlawfulness
of an interference with an individual's possessory
interest in property depends on the reasonableness of
the seizure. See Soldal v. Cook County, 121 L. Ed.
2d 450, 113 S. Ct. 538, 549 (1992). Because a
judicial employer has an overriding interest in
securing the confidentiality of chambers' work
product and in making sure that an angry clerk does
not attempt to confiscate or destroy important court
property, the brief alleged withholding of Sheppard's
belongings while they were searched was not
unreasonable.
B. Seizure of Sheppard's Person
Sheppard's final claim is that there was an
unlawful seizure of his person when he was escorted
out of the courthouse by court officers on December
11, 1990. The district court dismissed this claim
finding that Sheppard's liberty was never restrained.
We agree.
In order to determine whether a particular
encounter between police officers and an individual
constitutes a "seizure" for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, a court must decide "if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870
(1980).
In the present case, as correctly noted by the
district court, Sheppard was "free to go anywhere
else that he desired, " with the exception of
Beerman's chambers and the court house. Had
Beerman retained Sheppard's car keys or his wallet,
then perhaps Sheppard arguably could have been
seized, because it would have prevented him from
being "free to leave." See, e.g., United States v.
Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
factors that might suggest a seizure include
"prolonged retention of a person's personal effects,
such as airplane tickets or identification."). Because
there are no such allegations in Sheppard's
complaint, Sheppard has failed to state a claim that
his person was seized.
We have examined Sheppard's remaining
contentions and find them to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
district court's dismissal of all of Sheppard's claims
other than his First Amendment free speech claim.
Regarding that claim, we find that in concluding that
Sheppard failed to state a violation of his First
Amendment right to free speech, the district court
made certain factual determinations that were not
appropriate on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's
dismissal of Sheppard's First Amendment freedom of
speech claim on the pleadings and remand for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In
doing so, however, we make no comment on the
merits of the claim nor do we preclude the district
court from re-examining the matter at some future,
more appropriate time in the proceedings. Our ruling
today is based only on the procedural posture in
which the case came before the district court.
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